




























































































































































































































































































Consumer　Products　andrervices 22．1％ 22．4％ 22．8％23．5％ 22．3％ 21．3％21．0％ 19．3％
Power　Systems17．1％ 7．6％ 16．6％ 8．1％ 14．8％ 6．5％ 15．1％ 6．7％
Industrial　Products　andbomponents 19．7％ 17．0％ 19．6％17．5％ 20．0％ 18．2％ 19．4％19．6％
Technical　Systems　andlaterials 22．0％ 22．0％ 22．6％ 22．4％ 25．2％25．3％ 26．8％26．7％
Foreign　Multi・industrynperations 13．6％ 9．8％ 13．2％ 10．1％ 12．1％ 9．1％ 12．1％ 9．8％
GE　Credit　Coporation0．4％ 3．1％ 0．4％ 3．2％ 0．4％ 3．4％0．4％ 4．0％
Utah　International5．1％ 18．1％ 4．9％ 15．3％ 5．2％ 16．2％ 5．2％ 13．9％

















Public　Systems22．3％ 16．1％ 22．5％ 20．2％ 23．7％18．1％ 25．4％ 17．2％
Power　Systems37．2％ 26．6％ 35．3％27．2％ 34．0％ 34．2％33．9％ 40．8％
Industry　Products36．5％ 51．7％38．0％ 44．5％ 38．1％40．0％ 36．5％ 32．7％
Broadcasting 2．8％ 123％ 2．9％ 11．4％ 2．9％ 12．4％ 3．0％ 9．6％
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celerating　corporate　transformation　that　occurred　in　the　1980s．
　　To　summarize，　even　though　both　companies　took　a　similar　investment　trajectory　in　the　1970s，
their　corporate　finance　sides　were　different　to　a　varying　degree　in　the　1980s．　In　terms　of　achieve－
ments　in　the　1970s，　GE　succeeded　in　establishing　a　virtuous　and　successful　cycle　of　investment　and
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growth　by　pursuing　the“No．10r　No．2Strategy”under　CEO　Welch，　a　process　by　which　GE
selected　the　businesses　worthy　of　continuous　investment．　Meanwhile，　like　GE，　WH　retained　and
strengthened　the　businesses　which　it　carried　over　from　the　1970s．　A　distinguishing　factor　was　some
part　of　this　business　portfolio　was　less　high－tech　in　nature，　such　as　of丑ce　furniture，　beverage　bot－
tling　and　land／community　development．　In　addition，　unlike　GE，　WH　was　unable　to　carry　out　huge
investments　in　existing　business　or　M＆A　due　to　profitability　challenges　and　other　troubles　that
took　place　in　the　1970s．　With　increasing　competition，　this　led　to　a　decline　in　investments　in　both
R＆Dand　capital，　as　seen　in　Figures　4　and　5，　both　of　which　are　crucial　investments　for　an　industrial
corporation．　The　WH　and　GE　respective　cycles　were　on　opposite　tracks．
IV．　Conclusion
　　Using　the　case　of　GE　and　WH，　this　article　has　sought　to　explore　and　de丘ne　the　critical　point　of
divergence　between　one　corporation　which　achieved　re－g士owth　and　remained　as　a　successful　con－
glomerate，　as　opposed　to　another　which　was　drastically　transformed　with　negative　consequences．
This　can　inform　on　the　process　by　which　American　industrial　conglomerates　responded　to　changes
in　the　world　after　the　close　of　the　American　Century　and　toward　the　21st　century．
　　There　are　moments　and　events　to　choose　from　in　attempting　to　determine　the　cause　for　diver－
gence　of　GE　and　WH．　Some　of　them　were　large　and　signi且cant　and　others　smaller　and　less　evident．
Over　time　these　moments　accumulate，　and　little　ones　add　up　to　signi且cant　impacts　and　collectively
create　the　ultimate　destiny　and　uniqueness　of　each　of　the　companies．　In　the　end　GE　has　remained　as
asuccessful　industrial　conglomerate　while　WH　was　transformed　to　a　media　company，　and　was
eventually　acquired　by　the　media　conglomerate　Viacom，　on　May　4，2000xxvi．
　　This　article　proposes　the　period　from　1987　to　1991　as　the　crucial　point　of　divergence　between　GE
and　WH．　After　WH　was　faced　with　the丘nancial　service　business　crisis　in　the　early　1990s，　they　fol－
lowed　different　paths　for　the　remainder　of　the　20th　century．　While　GE　continued　to　grow　itself　as　a
lasting　industrial　conglomerate，　WH　took　the　route　to　media，　starting　in　1993　as　CBS　and　lasting
into　the　rest　of　20th　century．
　　The　article　also　reveals　that，　from　the　perspective　of　the　investment　trajectories　taken　by　GE　and
WH，　they　both　increased　their　investments　in　the　1970s．　In　the　following　decade　differences　sur・
faced，　GE　had　established　a　virtuous　cycle　of　investments，　and　associated　growth　between　invest・
ment　and　corporate　growth，　while　WH　struggled　to　grow　at　all．　The　1980s　depicts　the　departure
point　between　two且rms，　this　under　the　wave　of　global　competition　and　restructuring．　What　each
company　did，　or　did　not　do，　in　the　1970s　largely　affected　what　they　were　able　to　do　during　the
period　of　the　wave．
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　　Although　both　companies　managed　to　introduce　strategic　management　tools，　improve　their　busi－
ness　portfolios，　reorganize　themselves，　and　maintain　sustainable　growth，　their　corporate　finance
aspects　and　the　resulting　diversi丘ed　business　lines　were　different　in　the　1970s．　Their　respective　lev－
els　of　corporate　profitability　were　relatively　different　and　divergence　in　financial　leverage　trends
were　even　more　pronounced．　In　the　end，　GE　entered　the　1980s　with　a　more　healthy且nancial　stand－
ing　than　did　WH．　The　more　increased　the　global　competition　in　the　1980s　became，　the　more　the　ex－
isting　business　portfolio　became　the　key　to　success　or　even　surviva1．　GE　diversified　into　relatively
high－tech　business　lines　while　WH　held　fast　on　low－tech　business．　Although　both　strengthened　their
retained　businesses　in　addition　to　the　financial　business，　GE　was　also　strengthening　its　high－tech
business，　such　as　in　medical　equipment（through　a　loint　venture　with　Yokowaka　Medical　System　of
Japan　in　1982　and　a　business　swap　with　Thomson　of　France　for　the　medical　systems　business　in
1987）and　aircraft　engines（with　signi五cant　investments　and　continuohs　partnership　with　the
French　engine　manufacturer　SNECMA），while　WH　was　acquiring　furniture　businesses（acquisi－
tion　of　Shaw－Walker　Company　and　Re田nc　in．1989　and　Knoll　International　in　1990）．GE　was　well－
placed　to　continue　to　be　a　world　leader　with　its　inマolvement　in　the　high－tech　industry，　through　in－
creased　pro且t　that　was　reinvested，　while　WH　was　orienting　to　low－tech　industrial　competition　and
faced　difficulty　in　gaining・suf丑cient　pro丘t　to　both　overcome　the　financial　crisis　and　maintain　com－
petitive　advantages　in　its　core　industrial　businesses．
　　When　the且nancial　services　businesses　caused　problems　for．both　GE　and　WH，　WH　could　not
cover　the　huge　losses　while　GE　was　able　to　weather　the　effects，　resulting　in　the　contrary　paths　fol－
lowed　toward　the　21st　century．　From　this　article’s　findings．，　it　is　worthwhile　to　explore　the　repercus－
sive　consequences　of　what　occurred　before　the　management　challenges　of　the　1980s，　even　though
there　is　no　doubt　the　management　decisions　in　the　period　itself　had　direct　in且uence　on　the　contrary
paths．．
　　Since　they　were丘rst　established，　GE　and　WH　had　common　core　business　such　as　lighting，　major
appliahces，　tufbine，　transportation　and　motors．　However，　until　they　entered　into・the　1980s，　they
also　had　a　different　set　of　business　lines，　such　as　natural　resources，　aircraft　engines　and　medical　for
GE，　beverage「bottling，　furniture　and　land　development　for　WH．　Their　respective　business　struc－
tures　were　largel夕linked　to　their　corporate　financial　standings．　This　distinction　proved　to　be　a
strong　advantage　to　GE　as　an　industrial　corporation．　As　a　result，　these　two　industrial　conglomerates
in　the　electric　equipment　industry　were　dissimilar　once　transformed，　prior　to　the　start　of　the　new
century．
　　At　the　end　of　American　Century，　the　same　American　industrial　corporations　which　had　led　and
reaped　the　gains　in　economic　growthxxvii　then　had　to　grapple　with　the　problems　that　had　emerged
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and　the　changes　taking　place　in　the　world．　All　of　them　attempted　to　find　the　best　solution．　Some　of
them　were　successfu1　by　remaining　as　is，　although　they　were　seen　to　be　over－diversified，　and　others
chose　the　drastic　metamorphosis　route，　even　to　the　extent　of　having　to　change　their　corporate
name．　There　are　differences　amongst　over－diversified且rms　that　need　to　be　recognized，　and　to　some
degree　it　is　a　logical　leap　to　surmise　that　over－diversification　was　the　reason　for　failure　of　such
American　industrial　firms．　This　article　reveals　that　there　is　more　to　this　dynamic　of　over－diversifica一
ti6n　than　what　can　be　explained　by　a　simple　leap　in　logic，　as　is　demonstrated　in　the　representative
cases　of　GE　and　WH．　These　differences　can　benefit　from　further　study　and　analysis．
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）°cvi　The　present　CBS　was　established　at　the　end　of　2005，　when　old　Viacom　was　separated　into　two　companies．
　　　Although“Westinghouse”brand　still　exists　today，　almost　all　products　are　provided　by且rms　unrelated　to
　　　the　previous　Westinghouse　Electric　Corporation，　but　that　are　licensed　under　the　Westinghouse　brand　by　the
　　　Westinghouse　Electric　Corporation，　which　was　established　as　the　Westinghouse　brand　licensing　company　in
　　　1998under　CBS．　Westinghouse　nuclear　power　business　exists　as　Westinghouse　Electric　Company，　which
　　　has　been　part　of　the　Toshiba　group　since　2006．
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